Difference between revisions of "Koushanfar2011a"
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|abstract=<p>This paper presents a unified formal framework for integrated circuits (ICs) Trojan detection that can simultaneously employ multiple noninvasive side-channel measurement types (modalities). After formally defining the IC Trojan detection for each side-channel measurement and analyzing the complexity, we devise a new submodular formulation of the problem objective function. Based on the objective function properties, an efficient Trojan detection method with strong approximation and optimality guarantees is introduced. Signal processing methods for calibrating the impact of interchip and intrachip correlations are presented. We define a new sensitivity metric that formally quantifies the impact of modifications to each existing gate that is affected by Trojan. Using the new metric, we compare the Trojan detection capability of different measurement types for static (quiescent) current, dynamic (transient) current, and timing (delay) side-channel measurements. We propose four methods for combining the detection results that are gained from different measurement modalities and show how the sensitivity results can be used for a systematic combining of the detection results. Experimental evaluations on benchmark designs reveal the low-overhead and effectiveness of the new Trojan detection framework and provides a comparison of different detection combining methods.</p> | |abstract=<p>This paper presents a unified formal framework for integrated circuits (ICs) Trojan detection that can simultaneously employ multiple noninvasive side-channel measurement types (modalities). After formally defining the IC Trojan detection for each side-channel measurement and analyzing the complexity, we devise a new submodular formulation of the problem objective function. Based on the objective function properties, an efficient Trojan detection method with strong approximation and optimality guarantees is introduced. Signal processing methods for calibrating the impact of interchip and intrachip correlations are presented. We define a new sensitivity metric that formally quantifies the impact of modifications to each existing gate that is affected by Trojan. Using the new metric, we compare the Trojan detection capability of different measurement types for static (quiescent) current, dynamic (transient) current, and timing (delay) side-channel measurements. We propose four methods for combining the detection results that are gained from different measurement modalities and show how the sensitivity results can be used for a systematic combining of the detection results. Experimental evaluations on benchmark designs reveal the low-overhead and effectiveness of the new Trojan detection framework and provides a comparison of different detection combining methods.</p> | ||
|pages=162 -174 | |pages=162 -174 | ||
|month=3 | |||
|year=2011 | |||
|number=1 | |number=1 | ||
|volume=6 | |volume=6 | ||
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|title=A Unified Framework for Multimodal Submodular Integrated Circuits Trojan Detection | |title=A Unified Framework for Multimodal Submodular Integrated Circuits Trojan Detection | ||
|entry=article | |entry=article | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 03:38, 4 September 2021
| Koushanfar2011a | |
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| author | Farinaz Koushanfar and Azalia Mirhoseini |
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| journal | IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security |
| month | 3 |
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| number | 1 |
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| pages | 162 -174 |
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| title | A Unified Framework for Multimodal Submodular Integrated Circuits Trojan Detection |
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| volume | 6 |
| year | 2011 |
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| url | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?reload=true\&arnumber=5657256\&tag=1 |
Email:
farinaz@ucsd.edu
farinaz@ucsd.edu
Address:
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Lab Location: EBU1-2514
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093