Difference between revisions of "Nelson2009"
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|abstract=Ghost circuitry (GC) insertion is the malicious addition of hardware in the specification and/or implementation of an IC by an attacker intending to change circuit functionality. There are numerous GC insertion sources, including untrusted foundries, synthesis tools and libraries, testing and verification tools, and configuration scripts. Moreover, GC attacks can greatly compromise the security and privacy of hardware users, either directly or through interaction with pertinent systems, application software, or with data. GC detection is a particularly difficult task in modern and pending deep submicron technologies due to intrinsic manufacturing variability. Here, we provide algebraic and statistical approaches for the detection of ghost circuitry. A singular value decomposition (SVD)-based technique for gate characteristic recovery is applied to solve a system of equations created using fast and non-destructive measurements of leakage power and/or delay. This is then combined with statistical constraint manipulation techniques to detect embedded ghost circuitry. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on the ISCAS 85 benchmarks. | |abstract=Ghost circuitry (GC) insertion is the malicious addition of hardware in the specification and/or implementation of an IC by an attacker intending to change circuit functionality. There are numerous GC insertion sources, including untrusted foundries, synthesis tools and libraries, testing and verification tools, and configuration scripts. Moreover, GC attacks can greatly compromise the security and privacy of hardware users, either directly or through interaction with pertinent systems, application software, or with data. GC detection is a particularly difficult task in modern and pending deep submicron technologies due to intrinsic manufacturing variability. Here, we provide algebraic and statistical approaches for the detection of ghost circuitry. A singular value decomposition (SVD)-based technique for gate characteristic recovery is applied to solve a system of equations created using fast and non-destructive measurements of leakage power and/or delay. This is then combined with statistical constraint manipulation techniques to detect embedded ghost circuitry. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on the ISCAS 85 benchmarks. | ||
|pages=221 - 234 | |pages=221 - 234 | ||
|month= | |||
|year=2009 | |||
|booktitle=Information Hiding (IH) | |booktitle=Information Hiding (IH) | ||
|title=SVD-Based Ghost Circuitry Detection | |title=SVD-Based Ghost Circuitry Detection | ||
|entry=inproceedings | |entry=inproceedings | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 03:34, 4 September 2021
| Nelson2009 | |
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| author | M. Nelson and A. Nahapetian and F. Koushanfar and M. Potkonjak |
| booktitle | Information Hiding (IH) |
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| pages | 221 - 234 |
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| title | SVD-Based Ghost Circuitry Detection |
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| year | 2009 |
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Email:
farinaz@ucsd.edu
farinaz@ucsd.edu
Address:
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Lab Location: EBU1-2514
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093