Difference between revisions of "Shahrjerdi2014"
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|url=http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=7001348 | |url=http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=7001348 | ||
|abstract=<p>An integrated circuit (IC) Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) is envisioned to enable advanced supply chain hardware authentication and tracing capabilities. The suggested SHIELD is expected to be a ultralower power, minuscule electronic component that is physically attached to the host IC. This paper focuses on two important adversarial acts on SHIELD: physical reverse engineering and physical side-channel analysis. These attacks can be launched through mechanical or optical means and they can reveal and/or modify the confidential on-chip data or enable reverse-engineering of the design. For detection of these attacks and subsequent erasing of the sensitive data, sensors, erasure devices, and the relevant control circuitry need to be added to the SHIELD. We describe the device-level operation of the optical (photodetectors) and mechanical (nano- or micro-electromechanical switches) sensors and how they can be integrated within an IC to detect physical attacks. The operation of these micro/nano-scale sensors is unreliable due to environmental, operational, and structural fluctuations and noise. We outline system-level approaches to design a reliable countermeasure against physical attacks using unreliable sensors.</p> | |abstract=<p>An integrated circuit (IC) Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) is envisioned to enable advanced supply chain hardware authentication and tracing capabilities. The suggested SHIELD is expected to be a ultralower power, minuscule electronic component that is physically attached to the host IC. This paper focuses on two important adversarial acts on SHIELD: physical reverse engineering and physical side-channel analysis. These attacks can be launched through mechanical or optical means and they can reveal and/or modify the confidential on-chip data or enable reverse-engineering of the design. For detection of these attacks and subsequent erasing of the sensitive data, sensors, erasure devices, and the relevant control circuitry need to be added to the SHIELD. We describe the device-level operation of the optical (photodetectors) and mechanical (nano- or micro-electromechanical switches) sensors and how they can be integrated within an IC to detect physical attacks. The operation of these micro/nano-scale sensors is unreliable due to environmental, operational, and structural fluctuations and noise. We outline system-level approaches to design a reliable countermeasure against physical attacks using unreliable sensors.</p> | ||
|month=11 | |||
|year=2014 | |||
|booktitle=International Conference on Computer-Aided Design | |booktitle=International Conference on Computer-Aided Design | ||
|title=Shielding and Securing Integrated Circuits with Sensors | |title=Shielding and Securing Integrated Circuits with Sensors | ||
|entry=inproceedings | |entry=inproceedings | ||
| | |pdf=Shahrjerdi2014.pdf | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 17:40, 9 November 2021
| Shahrjerdi2014 | |
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| entry | inproceedings |
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| author | Davood Shahrjerdi and Jeyavijayan Rajendran and Siddharth Garg and Farinaz Koushanfar and Ramesh Karri |
| booktitle | International Conference on Computer-Aided Design |
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| month | 11 |
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| title | Shielding and Securing Integrated Circuits with Sensors |
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| year | 2014 |
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| url | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=7001348 |
| Shahrjerdi2014.pdf | |
Email:
farinaz@ucsd.edu
farinaz@ucsd.edu
Address:
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Lab Location: EBU1-2514
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093