Difference between revisions of "Rostami2014"
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|keywords=Hardware security, Physical Unclonable Functions, security protocols | |keywords=Hardware security, Physical Unclonable Functions, security protocols | ||
|abstract=<p>This paper proposes novel robust and low-overhead physical unclonable function (PUF) authentication and key exchange protocols that are resilient against reverse-engineering attacks. The protocols are executed between a party with access to a physical PUF (prover) and a trusted party who has access to the PUF compact model (verifier). The proposed protocols do not follow the classic paradigm of exposing the full PUF responses or a transformation of them. Instead, random subsets of the PUF response strings are sent to the verifier so the exact position of the subset is obfuscated for the third-party channel observers. Authentication of the responses at the verifier side is done by matching the substring to the available full response string; the index of the matching point is the actual obfuscated secret (or key) and not the response substring itself. We perform a thorough analysis of resiliency of the protocols against various adversarial acts, including machine learning and statistical attacks. The attack analysis guides us in tuning the parameters of the protocol for an efficient and secure implementation. The low overhead and practicality of the protocols are evaluated and confirmed by hardware implementation.</p> | |abstract=<p>This paper proposes novel robust and low-overhead physical unclonable function (PUF) authentication and key exchange protocols that are resilient against reverse-engineering attacks. The protocols are executed between a party with access to a physical PUF (prover) and a trusted party who has access to the PUF compact model (verifier). The proposed protocols do not follow the classic paradigm of exposing the full PUF responses or a transformation of them. Instead, random subsets of the PUF response strings are sent to the verifier so the exact position of the subset is obfuscated for the third-party channel observers. Authentication of the responses at the verifier side is done by matching the substring to the available full response string; the index of the matching point is the actual obfuscated secret (or key) and not the response substring itself. We perform a thorough analysis of resiliency of the protocols against various adversarial acts, including machine learning and statistical attacks. The attack analysis guides us in tuning the parameters of the protocol for an efficient and secure implementation. The low overhead and practicality of the protocols are evaluated and confirmed by hardware implementation.</p> | ||
|month=1 | |||
|year=2014 | |||
|volume=2 | |volume=2 | ||
|journal=IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing | |journal=IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing | ||
|title=Robust and Reverse-Engineering Resilient PUF Authentication and Key-Exchange by Substring Matching | |title=Robust and Reverse-Engineering Resilient PUF Authentication and Key-Exchange by Substring Matching | ||
|entry=article | |entry=article | ||
| | |pdf=Rostami2014.pdf | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 17:39, 9 November 2021
| Rostami2014 | |
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| entry | article |
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| author | Masoud Rostami and Mehrdad Majzoobi and Farinaz Koushanfar and Dan Wallach and Srini Devadas |
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| journal | IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing |
| month | 1 |
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| title | Robust and Reverse-Engineering Resilient PUF Authentication and Key-Exchange by Substring Matching |
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| volume | 2 |
| year | 2014 |
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| url | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=\&arnumber=6714458 |
| Rostami2014.pdf | |
Email:
farinaz@ucsd.edu
farinaz@ucsd.edu
Address:
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0407
Jacobs Hall, Room 6401
La Jolla, CA 92093-0407
Lab Location: EBU1-2514
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA 92093